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tion. In an online experiment, subjects stated their perceived risk of contract-
ing a foodborne illness before and after receiving information about the eating
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liefs consistent with the Bayesian learning hypothesis. Personal consumption
habits a ected belief revisions in the expected direction, while precautionary
behavior entered the updating process through the priors. Fewer than 20%
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1 Introduction
People often respond to public health policies in ways that are inconsistent
with economic theory. They overreact to some risks while they ignore others
(Slovic et al. 2000); they are reluctant to give up unhealthy behaviors though
they know it would be better for them (O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001); and
they take healthy behaviors as excuse for indulging in unhealthy behaviors.
Examples include eating more when foods are low in calories (Wisdom et al.
2010) and smoking cigarettes down to the bone while cutting back on cigarettes
(Adda and Cornaglia 2006).
Reasons for such obvious deviations from the rational consumer model
are manifold (McFadden 2006) and include cognitive and attentional limita-
tions, emotional arousal, various forms of procrastination, and di culties in
processing health information (Cawley and Ruhm 2011). In this paper, we
focus on the processing of information about health risks. In particular, we
study how consumers perceive the risk of contracting a foodborne illness be-
fore and after the provision of risk-related information. Risk perception is a
critical link in the causal chain between consumer information and behavioral
responses (Magat and Viscusi 1992; Viscusi 1998; Sloan et al. 2003). A better
understanding of how consumers form perceptions of food risks and how they
adjust their beliefs to new information is therefore of considerable interest
to policymakers. The interest is fueled by its implications for the evaluation
of existing food safety policies and by regulatory needs to accurately predict
behavioral responses to new consumer information and awareness campaigns.
Success or failure of such campaigns matters because food pathogens cause bil-
lions of episodes of foodborne illness each year and the corresponding welfare
costs are tremendous.1
Two questions emerge. Do public information programs a ect health
risk perceptions? And if so, do they alter consumer behavior in the predicted
manner? Again, answers to these questions require a better understanding of
1In the U.S. alone, the annual social cost of foodborne illnesses is more than $50 billion
(Schar  2012).
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the processing of risk-related information. The uptake of information plays a
key role in studies of risk perception (Slovic et al. 2000). Both economists (e.g.,
Arrow 1982; Viscusi 1997; McFadden 1999) and psychologists (e.g., Johnson
and Tversky 1983; Loewenstein et al. 2001; Kahneman 2003; Slovic et al.
2004) have long recognized that people make a number of common mistakes
when they update risk beliefs with newly available information: small risks are
overestimated while large ones are underestimated, risks are assessed based on
emotions rather than cognitive evaluations, and more attention is given to bad
news than to good news.2
Over the past 30 years, a number of empirical studies have addressed
the impact of information on subjective risk beliefs. Viscusi and O’Connor
(1984) elicited chemical workers’ perception of job hazards based on warning
labels. Smith and Johnson (1998) studied the e ect of public information
programs on homeowners’ attitudes toward the health risk associated with
radon exposure. Dickie and Gerking (1996) explored public perceptions of skin
cancer. Viscusi (1997) studied location decisions in the presence of ambiguous
information about air pollution. More recently, Cameron (2005) tested how
conflicting information a ects the perceived risk of climate change; Lundborg
and Lindgren (2004) and Viscusi and Hakes (2008) examined beliefs about
lung cancer risk and smoking behavior in Sweden and the U.S., respectively;
Andersson and Lundborg (2007) compared the perception of road-tra c and
overall mortality risk in Sweden.
Most individuals in the above studies revised their risk beliefs in the
expected direction. However, the studies largely ignored the endogenous na-
ture of health risks. Indeed, people often have private information about their
health and take precautionary measures to reduce the likelihood or severity of
bad health outcomes (Shogren and Stamland 2007). Such measures are typi-
cally unobserved in observational studies, but may systematically a ect both
perceptions and actions. For example, consumers choose the quality, storage
2As people process information in accordance with their feelings about a particular risk
(Loewenstein et al. 2001; Slovic et al. 2004), it is of little surprise that negative news
attract more attention. The emotional filtering is apparently reversed when subjects form
and revise beliefs about desirable aspects of life (Eil and Rao 2011; Mobius et al. 2011).
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place, and preparation of their foods, thereby a ecting the likelihood of con-
tracting a foodborne illness. It might thus be perfectly rational for a consumer
to hold a subjective risk belief that di ers from the statistical population risk.
This paper presents a belief-elicitation protocol that permits capturing
the impact of precautionary behaviors and other idiosyncratic characteristics
a ecting both the formation and the revision of subjective risk beliefs. In what
is essentially a panel structure, a representative sample of French consumers
stated their perceived chance of contracting a foodborne illness from eating
fish. We first elicited subjects’ risk beliefs without any specific information.
We repeated the elicitation after having provided subjects with information
about the average consumer’s fish consumption, the corresponding popula-
tion average risk, and various risky and risk-averting behaviors. The chained
elicitation procedure allows us to explore subjects’ responses to risk-related
information, heterogeneity in the revision of risk beliefs, and deviations from
the Bayesian rationality assumption that underlies the design of most—if not
all—consumer information campaigns.
In a nutshell, we find that the majority of subjects updated their beliefs
consistently with the Bayesian learning hypothesis. These subjects responded
to information about the statistical risk by reducing their prior risk beliefs if
these were above the statistical risk and by increasing their prior risk beliefs
if they were below the statistical risk. This finding holds whether or not
we control for behavioral and/or socioeconomic factors. Precautionary e ort
in handling and preparing food had the expected attenuating e ect on the
formation of prior risk beliefs, but did not directly a ect the updating process.
This result underpins the importance of controlling for confounding factors in
the formation of risk beliefs and has several implications for predicting the
outreach of existing health and consumption advisories.
Using finite mixture models, we decompose the heterogeneity in belief
revisions and find four distinct updating patterns: (1) subjects who ignore
the new information altogether; (2) subjects who take the information at face
value (i.e. accept the statistical risk as theirs); (3) subjects who combine the
provided information and their prior to update beliefs; and (4) subjects who
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update in an inconsistent manner. The mixture modeling approach allows us
to link the emerging patterns back to personal characteristics. In particular,
we find that older, less educated and less literate subjects are more likely to
adapt either strategy (1) or (4) when updating their risk beliefs. As we shall
discuss in more detail both refusal of information and lack of numeracy are
problematic from the regulator’s point of view as they undermine the e cacy
of public health policies that seek to change behavior by informing consumers.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we operationalize the
Bayesian learning model and derive a formal definition of rational updating
that is conditional on the precautionary e ort expended by the updater. Sec-
tion 3 provides details of the belief-elicitation task and the sample character-
istics. Section 4 outlines our econometric approach. Section 5 presents the
results of our study. In Section 6, we discuss the response to information both
at the individual and the aggregate level. Section 7 concludes.
2 Bayesian Learning Model
Ample evidence from both experimental and observational studies suggests
that people overestimate the likelihood of rare events and underestimate the
likelihood of frequent ones (Barron and Yechiam 2009). Since the seminal
paper by Lichtenstein et al. (1978) dozens of studies have shown that this
observation specifically applies to the context of health risks, with people being
either overly optimistic or pessimistic about their risk of dying or of developing
a specific disease.3
Economic theory holds that accurate information about the nature of
the risk and the means of precaution may help people to better align their
beliefs to the actual risk. Yet in the real world people might—willingly or
unwillingly—ignore information. Viscusi (1989) assumed that subjects do not
treat the probabilities presented to them as fully informative and proposed a
model in which individuals use probabilistic information in a Bayesian fashion
3Harris and Hahn (2011) warn that many of these studies might be methodologically
flawed.
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to revise their risk beliefs.4 He argued that the Bayesian updating process
is consistent with two possible interpretations: individuals might not have
full confidence in the source of information, or they might simply treat any
risk-related information as not perfectly applicable to their individual circum-
stances.
2.1 Theoretical Model
Both interpretations allow people to discount the new information within the
updating process. This can be formalized in the most basic version of the
Bayesian learning model:
qi =
“pi + ›s
“ + › = “
úpi + ›ús, (1)
where qi denotes individual i’s posterior risk belief, which is formed based
on i’s prior risk belief pi and the information about the statistical risk s; “
and › are the information contents associated with pi and s, respectively; and
“ú = “/(“ + ›) and ›ú = ›/(“ + ›) are the corresponding precision weights.
Equation (1) assumes that individuals form their posterior belief as a
weighted average of the belief they held prior to receiving the risk-related in-
formation and the inference drawn from the new information. A limitation of
the basic Bayesian learning model is that it treats the interpretation of new
information as a black box. Smith and Johnson (1988) proposed a generaliza-
tion of the basic model in which factors that a ect the inference process might
also influence people’s perception of the relative precision of either their prior
beliefs or the information content. As Smith and Johnson note, it is likely
that some of these factors also a ect the formation of prior risk beliefs.
Based on these insights, the Bayesian learning model can be extended
to explore heterogeneity in the response to risk-related information. We as-
sume that people form their posterior risk belief by processing new pieces of
information and combining them with knowledge of personal exposure and
4Similar models have been used by psychologists since the early 1950s (see Slovic and
Lichtenstein 1971).
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precautionary behavior. This leads to the behavioral model:
qi = “ú(Ai, ◊A)p(Bi, ◊B) + ›ú(Ci, ◊C)s( Di, ◊D), (2)
where ◊• are parameter vectors. The weighting functions “ú(Ai, ◊A) and
›ú(Ci, ◊C) are contingent upon factors (summarized in vectors Ai and Ci)
that influence individual perception of the relative precision of the prior and
the information, respectively.
The prior risk belief p(Bi, ◊B) © pi is a function of personal factors
(age, gender, education, etc.) collected in the vector Bi. Similarly, personal
inference from the received risk information s( Di, ◊D) © si is a function of
behavioral factors (exposure, precautionary e ort, etc.). Instead of directly
including the latter factors, we measure individual i’s behavioral deviation
from the average consumer by the vector  Di. This deviation is crucial for
individual i’s interpretation of the statistical risk s. If i believes herself to be
more (or less) exposed to a specific risk than the average person, she uses s as
a reference point for adjusting her prior belief (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992).
We invoke the behavioral implications of equation (2) to define what is
a rational response to risk-related information conditional on the consumer’s
behavior. Consider individual i’s response to information about the average
consumer’s behavior and about the corresponding statistical risk s. Given the
consumer’s observed prior risk belief pi, we define consistent updating by the
following set of behavioral rules.
Definition. A consistent response to risk-related information does not violate
any of the following conditions: (i) if pi = s and  Di = 0, then s = pi = qi;
(ii) if pi > s and  Di = 0, then s Æ qi Æ pi; (iii) if pi < s and  Di = 0,
then s Ø qi Ø pi; (iv) if pi Ø s and  Di > 0, then s Æ qi; (v) if pi Æ s and
 Di < 0, then s Ø qi; (vi) if pi > s and  Di < 0, then pi Ø qi; (vii) if pi < s
and  Di > 0, then pi Æ qi.
Conditions (i)-(iii) provide a behavioral reformulation of equation (1)
that applies to individuals who behave like the average consumer; conditions
(iv)-(vii) prescribe how an individual should respond when they engage in more
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or less risky behavior than the average consumer. Figure 1 maps out all possi-
ble belief revisions. Compliance with the first three conditions corresponds to
subjective belief revisions in the gray-shaded area. Compliance with the latter
four conditions suggest that belief revisions outside the gray-shaded area are
rational only if the subject di ers from the average consumer in a prescribed
manner. Hence, the definition classifies any dynamically consistent belief re-
vision as rational (Savage 1954). In the empirical part, we will make use of
the distinction between consistent and inconsistent responses to risk-related
information.
Figure 1: Landscape of possible belief revisions
Notes: Each of the conditions of the consistency definition delimits a specific area: condition
(i) ~ A; condition (ii) ~ C; condition (iii) ~ B; condition (iv) ~ C fi E; condition (v) ~ C fi G;
condition (vi) ~ B fi F; condition (vii) ~ B fi D.
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2.2 Empirical Model
In practice, we often do not have su cient information about the detailed
behavioral processes captured by equation (2) to estimate the parameters of
interest. Yet under reasonable assumptions, an empirically testable version of
the extended Bayesian learning model can be obtained (Smith and Johnson
1988). First, we presume substantial overlap between Ai, Bi, and Ci, and
stack them into the single vector Xi. Second, we impose a linearly additive
form for each of the behavioral functions in equation (2). Upon appending
a stochastic error term, we obtain a workhorse model to analyze observed
heterogeneity in updating behavior:
qi = —0s+—1pi+—Õ2 Di+—Õ3Xi+—Õ4pi Di+—Õ5piXi+—Õ6 DiXi+—Õ7pi DiXi+‘i.
(3)
Equation (3) allows us to capture the possibility that some factors which a ect
the belief revision process may also a ect the formation of the prior risk belief.
3 Experimental Design
Two premises guided the development of our belief-elicitation protocol: (1)
People are not very good in making sense of small probabilities, but (2) they do
fairly well in reporting expectations for specific states of the world as a percent
chance (Manski 2004). The belief-elicitation task proceeded as follows. We
first informed subjects about the annual number of cases of foodborne illness
in France (about 250,000). With this information in hand, they stated on
a semi-quantitative scale how frequently they expected to su er a foodborne
illness.5 That is they gave us an estimate of their personal risk of contracting
a foodborne illness. Next, we instructed subjects to assume they will su er a
foodborne illness sometime next year, and inquired how likely they thought it
was (in terms of a percent chance) that the cause for their illness would be
5The scale included eight ordered categories, ranging from once per month to less than
once in a lifetime.
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from eating fish.6 In other words, we elicited the conditional risk of a fishborne
illness. The task was computer-based and subjects indicated their conditional
risk estimates using a percent slider.
In a following step, subjects received information about the fraction of
cases of foodborne illness in France attributable to eating fish, the consumption
habits of French fish consumers, and behaviors that may reduce or increase
the risk of contracting a foodborne illness.7 We asked them to consider this in-
formation when revising their prior risk estimate. This time the percent slider
had additional marks indicating the subject’s prior and the statistical risk.
Based on the information provided to them, subjects who knew the approxi-
mate population of France (about 66 million) could calculate the population
annual average risk of foodborne illness (250, 000/66 million t 4/1, 000) and
the risk of illness from eating fish (16% ◊ 250, 000/66 million t 6/10, 000).
Moreover, we can infer the subject’s belief about her absolute risk of illness
from eating fish based on the elicited risk beliefs. Any deviation from the pop-
ulation average conditional risk can hence be explained by her specific patterns
of preparation and consumption of fish or other foods and her beliefs about
the absolute risk of the types of fish and other foods she consumes.8 While we
6Following Manski (2004, p.1343) we reminded subjects that “the percent chance must
be a number from 0 to 100. Numbers like 2 or 5 percent may be ’almost no chance’, 20
percent or so may mean ’not much chance’, a 45 or 55 percent chance may be a ’pretty even
chance’, 80 percent or so may mean a ’very good chance’, and a 95 or 98 percent chance
may be ’almost certain’.”
7Based on epidemiological data for France (Vaillant et al. 2005) we presented the condi-
tional risk that a foodborne illness is from eating fish as s = 16%.
8Eq. (1) can be re-written so that the conditional risk of a fishborne illness is broken up
into the absolute risk of contracting a fishborne illness F and the absolute risk of contracting
a foodborne illness N :
qi = “úpi + ›ús¡ Fq
Nq
= “ú Fp
Np
+ ›ú F¯
N¯
.
The experimental procedure consisted of the following steps: (1) subjects were told N¯ ; (2)
conditional on N¯ they formed an estimate of Np; (3) they provided an estimate of p = FpNp ;
(4) they received information about the statistical conditional risk s = F¯
N¯
; (5) based on
p = FpNp and s =
F¯
N¯
they provided an estimate of q = FqNq . For a Bayesian belief updater
Nq = Np, unless he based his assessment of Nq = Np on false assumptions about the average
consumer’s fish consumption and/or precautionary e ort. Consider the following example.
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enquired about fish consumption and preparation methods, our information
about these factors is necessarily limited.
The belief-elicitation task was included in a large online survey and ad-
ministered to a French consumer panel during July and September 2012. We
obtained answers from 1,003 panel members who eat fish at least once a week.
As the sample matches quotas for age, gender, region, and employment status,
we take it to be representative of French consumers.9 Apart from the usual
socioeconomic indicators we inquired about the quantity of consumed fish; the
preferred purchase, storage and preparation methods; the importance of var-
ious self-protection behaviors; and other attributes that may determine food
consumption choices (Shogren and Stamland 2007). Table 1 summarizes our
data.
Subject i beliefs his risk is p = 10% = FpNp =
10,000
250,000 , but he formed his belief about Np
based on the assumption that the average consumer eats fish once a week. Being told
that the average consumer eats fish three times a week may let i to revise his belief about
the risk of contracting a foodborne illness to Nq Ø Np, because the information provided
links the average absolute risk to behavioral factors. Our definition of consistent updating
accounts for such inferences drawn from the average consumer’s behavior, only requiring
belief revisions to be dynamically consistent in a Savagean sense (e.g., Nq < Np would be
an inconsistent inference from the information provided).
9Quotas were based on 2009 French census data (http://www.insee.fr/fr/
recensement-2009.htm). The required frequency of fish consumption imposed an addi-
tional eligibility constraint resulting in a response rate of roughly 25%.
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Table 1: Sample characteristics
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Notes: aMeasured on a scale from 0 (never) to 10 (always);b the numeracy test presented subjects with two
grids displaying risks of 5 in 10,000 and 10 in 10,000 and asked which one was larger.
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4 Econometric Approach
Two types of data emerge from the belief elicitation described above. We
directly obtain fractional responses on both the prior and the posterior beliefs
about the risk that a foodborne illness is from eating fish. Based on whether
the observed belief revisions comply with our definition of consistent updating,
we also obtain binary responses.10 Below, we outline our econometric approach
to the analysis of both fractional and binary response data.
4.1 Fractional Responses
The traditional approach to the analysis of fractional responses from the open
unit interval is to transform the data to the real line and then apply standard
linear regression models. However, such linearized models exhibit a number of
unattractive features (Ferrari and Cribari-Neto 2004; Smithson and Verkuilen
2006). The estimated parameters are interpretable in terms of the mean of
the transformed rather than the original response. Moreover, linearized mod-
els ignore that fractional response data are typically heteroskedastic, i.e. they
display less variation at the limits of the unit interval than in its middle range.
Lastly, distributions of elicited proportions are often asymmetric causing bi-
ased standard errors in small sample estimations.
The double-index beta regression model introduced by Ferrari and Cribari-
Neto (2004) and refined by Smithson and Verkuilen (2006) overcomes these
problems, making it the preferred statistical approach to analyze data on the
open unit interval (0,1).11 As its name implies, the model has two index func-
10One caveat applies to our classification exercise. At the outset we did not know the pre-
cautionary behavior of French consumers. The only quantitative information we provided to
the subjects was that, on average, French consumers eat fish three times per week (informa-
tion from the French Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Forestry, www.franceagrimer.fr).
In addition, we informed them that older people are more likely to contract a foodborne
illness than younger people; that the majority of French consumers do not eat raw fish; and
that storing fresh fish for more than three days significantly increases the risk of contracting
a foodborne illness. The classification uses only the information about consumer i’s devia-
tion from the average frequency of fish consumption and hence that is the only information
included in  Di.
1116 out of our 1,003 subjects stated posterior risk belief of zero. Following Smithson and
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tions: one for the mean and one for the precision. To characterize the mean
and precision functions as combinations of predictors, Ferrari and Cribari-Neto
(2004) re-parameterized the beta distribution to:
f(y|µ,„) =  („) (µ„) ((1≠ µ)„)y
µ„≠1(1≠y)(1≠µ)„≠1, 0 < y < 1, 0 < µ < 1, „ > 0,
(4)
where  (·) denotes the gamma function.12 The beta-distributed response vari-
able y has mean E [y] = µ and variance Var [y] = µ(1≠µ)/(1+„), where „ is a
precision parameter because, for µ fixed, the larger „ the smaller the variance.
Assume now that the fractional responses of our i = 1, 2, ..., n subjects
are beta-distributed, i.e. qi ≥ B(µi,„i). The parameters µi and „i can be
mapped onto the real line by appropriate link functions. We use the logit link
for the mean function and the log link for the precision function, respectively:
g(µi) = log(µi/(1≠ µi)) = —ÕXi ¡ µi = exp(—
ÕXi)
1 + exp(—ÕXi)
, and (5)
h(„i) = log(„i) = ’ ÕZi ¡ „i = exp(’ ÕZi). (6)
Here, Xi and Zi are vectors of covariates associated with the mean and pre-
cision parameter of the beta distribution, respectively. The corresponding
coe cient vectors — and ’ are estimated by maximum likelihood techniques
and statistical inference about their estimates is based on the central limit
theorem.
So far, we have assumed that heterogeneity in belief updating can be
su ciently explained by observable characteristics of the subjects. However,
latent characteristics may also a ect the formation and revision of risk beliefs
(Smith et al. 2001). Finite mixture models have become a popular means to
capture such unobserved heterogeneity among decision makers (e.g., Andersen
Verkuilen (2006) we used the ad-hoc transformation q = (q˜(n≠ 1) + 0.5)/n (where q˜ is the
untransformed fractional response and n = 1, 003) to restrict all observations to the open
unit interval.
12The beta distribution is commonly expressed as f(y|a, b) =  (a+b)G(a)G(b)ya≠1(1≠y)b≠1, 0 <
y < 1. Equation (4) is obtained by replacing a = µ„ and b = (1≠ µ)„.
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et al. 2008; Bruhin et al. 2010). The goal of mixture modeling is to estimate
the set of parameters in g(·) and h(·) for each of k = 1, 2, . . . , K latent classes
along with their membership function, so that the model predicts to which
class each observation most likely belongs (McLachan and Peel 2000).
Although well established in other fields, empirical applications of beta
regression mixtures in the social sciences are still rare. Notable exceptions are
the studies by Smithson and colleagues (2009; 2011), which present estimates
of the beta regression mixture model:
m(q|W,X,Z,Â) =
Kÿ
k=1
fik(W,–k)fk(q|µ(X, —k),„(Z, ’k)), (7)
where the vector Â = (–1, ...,–K , —1, ..., —K , ’1, ..., ’K) collects the class-specific
parameters of the discrete mixture density m(·); fk(·) is the density of the
parameterized beta distribution that belongs to the kth latent class; and fik(·)
is the corresponding membership function, which depends on a class-specific
constant and, possibly, on concomitant variables summarized in the vectorW
(Dayton and Macready 1988). The membership function itself is conveniently
modeled by the multinomial logit:
fik(W,–k) =
exp(–ÕkW)qK
u=1 exp(–ÕuW)
, (8)
whose identification requires normalizing the coe cient vector of class c to
zero (i.e., –c = 0).
The mixture model (7) has a non-trivial likelihood function, the maxi-
mization of which is cumbersome. We employ the expectation maximization
(EM) algorithm (Dempster et al. 1977) as implemented in the R package
‘betareg’ (version 3.0-4). The EM algorithm is an iterative procedure for max-
imizing likelihood functions in a missing data setting. In the context of latent
class mixture models, it is the class membership of the subjects that is un-
known. The EM algorithm iterates between the E-step: evaluation of the ex-
pected complete-data log-likelihood given the observed data by fitting equation
(8) to each observation; and the M-Step: maximization of the complete-data
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log-likelihood pertaining to equation (7), using previously derived individual
posterior class probabilities as weights.13 The iteration continues until the EM
algorithm converges to a stationary point of the likelihood function (McLachan
and Peel 2000). In the empirical application, we set the convergence criterion
to 1E-10 and repeated the estimation with 100 random starting values to re-
duce the risk of running into a local maximum.
4.2 Binary Responses
The most popular models to analyze binary response data are the standard
probit and logit, which rest on the assumption that the error distribution of
the underlying sorting process has unit variance. This assumption is invalid
whenever one group of subjects display greater variability in their response to
information than another. On one hand, such heterogeneity in variance across
subjects can arise due to uncertainty, misperception, or inattention. On the
other hand, subjects belonging to the same observable group might share latent
traits that systematically a ect the processing of risk-related information.
Consider the non-shaded areas of Figure 1. Belief revisions in these areas
are inconsistent unless the subject di ers from the average consumer in ways
prescribed by our consistency definition. Yet the violations of the Bayesian
learning model are qualitatively distinct. Subjects with prior risk beliefs lo-
cated in areas E and G (D and F) display baseline pessimism (optimism) in
the sense of Spinnewijn (2013): without information these subjects perceive
their risk to be larger (smaller) than the statistical risk, and upon receiving
information they further increase (reduce) their risk estimate. Posterior risk
beliefs located in areas D and E (F and G) suggest control pessimism (opti-
13In each iteration j, the E-Step calculates a Bayesian update of every subject’s posterior
probability of belonging to class k:
·ik(qi|Â(j)i ) =
fik(W,–(j)k )fk(q|µ(X,—(j)k ),„(Z, ’(j)k ))qK
u=1 fiu(W,–
(j)
u )fu(q|µ(X,—(j)u ),„(Z, ’(j)u ))
.
As Bruhin et al. (2010) note, the final posterior probabilities of belonging to class k is a
valuable result of the estimation because it provides information on the sharpness of the
classification.
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mism): subjects believe their personal behavior increases (reduces) the risk
above (below) the statistical risk.
It seems unlikely that di erent inconsistencies in updating share a com-
mon error distribution as some subjects will be less certain than others leading
to a wider variation in their revised beliefs. A straightforward way to deal with
heteroskedasticity in binary response data is to rescale the variance of sub-
groups based on some predictors of interest (Davidson and MacKinnon 1984).
The resulting heteroskedastic binary choice model has the likelihood function:
L (—,Ï|Xi,Vi) =
nŸ
i=1
C
F
A
—ÕXi
exp (ÏÕVi)
BDIi C
1≠ F
A
—ÕXi
exp (ÏÕVi)
BD1≠Ii
, (9)
where F (·) denotes the respective cumulative distribution function; Ii indicates
inconsistent updating according to the consistency definition; Xi and Vi are
vectors of covariates associated with the mean and scale, respectively;14 — and
Ï are the corresponding coe cient vectors. In the empirical application, we
estimate heteroskedastic probit models and include indicators for attitudes
toward baseline risk and risk controllability in Vi.
5 Results
We arrange the presentation of our results around the following three ques-
tions: Do people update their beliefs in a Bayesian manner? What factors
account for heterogeneity in belief updating? And what factors may predict
inconsistent belief revisions?
5.1 Observed Belief Updating
The histogram in panel A of Figure 2 illustrates that, before receiving infor-
mation about the average consumer’s risk, subjects were relatively uncertain
about their personal risk (mean = 32%, median = 25%). Moreover, we find a
14For identification reasons, Vi cannot contain a constant (Davidson and MacKinnon
1984).
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significant spike at 50% suggesting that some subjects had “no idea as to the
answer” (Fischho  and Bruine De Bruin 1999). The provision of risk-related
information reduced the perceived risk significantly (mean = 23%, median =
16%) and smoothed out the spike (Figure 2, panel B). However, the average
posterior subjective risk belief was still 8 percent points higher than the statis-
tical risk s, suggesting that on the sample level subjects displayed some control
pessimism (Spinnewijn 2013).
Figure 2: Histograms of observed belief revisions
18
Figure 3: Landscape of observed belief revisions
Notes: Points (cross marks) denote observations that do (not) comply with the consistency
definition. The red-dotted line gives the fit of the most basic beta regression model.
Figure 3 plots the posterior against the prior risk beliefs. The vast ma-
jority of subjects (81%) updated their risk belief in response to the information
provided. The dots on the horizontal line in Figure 3 represent 85 subjects
whose revised beliefs perfectly matched the statistical risk (i.e., ›ú = 1). Sim-
ilarly, the dots on the diagonal line represent 186 subjects who dismissed the
information altogether (i.e., ›ú = 0). The crosses mark 175 subjects who vi-
olate the conditions of the consistency definition. The dashed line represents
the best fit obtained from a simple beta regression of qi on pi.15 It confirms
15Since s is constant across subjects, its e ect cannot be separated from the regression
intercept. Normalizing the relative precision weights in equation (1) to sum to one, the
estimated precision weight attached to the information is ›ˆú = 1≠ “ˆú = 0.493.
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that on average subjects adjusted their beliefs upward (downward) if their
prior was smaller (larger) than the statistical risk.
5.2 Observed Heterogeneity in Belief Updating
Next we turn our attention to heterogeneity in the revision of risk beliefs. It
is widely accepted that personal characteristics and world views mediate the
perception of risks (Slovic 1999). The same factors may also a ect how new
information is processed to update beliefs about these risks. We explore het-
erogeneity in the updating process using the workhorse model (3). Because risk
beliefs are bounded to the unit interval, we employ the double-index beta re-
gression model for this analysis. In Table 2 we report on two distinct specifica-
tions of the beta regression model. The naïve model ignores that factors which
a ect the updating of risk beliefs might also a ect the formation of prior be-
liefs and/or the precautionary e ort expended by the consumer. With respect
to equation (3), the naïve model thus hypothesizes: —4 = —5 = —6 = —7 = 0.
In contrast, the extended model includes all two- and three-way interactions
between the socioeconomic characteristics of the subject, the precautionary
e ort, and the prior risk belief. In both specifications, we model the preci-
sion in belief updating as a function of age, gender, educational attainment,
and whether or not the subject passed a simple numeracy test. We hypoth-
esize that these factors are related to the numerical skills needed to process
risk-related information (Peters et al. 2006).
We discuss the major findings of the beta regression analysis in terms
of first di erences in predicted posterior risk beliefs (reported in Table 2)
because the interpretation of interaction e ects in generalized linear models
is complicated by the link function (Ai and Norton 2003). Figure 4 plots the
predicted posterior beliefs for both specifications against the observed priors
holding all other variables fixed at sample means. The plot confirms the finding
that, on average, subjects substantially reduced their prior risk beliefs upon
receiving the risk-related information. The dashed plots show counterfactual
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predictions for particularly risky and precautionary behaviors.16 While the
model predictions are almost identical for the most precautionary consumer,
they di er somewhat for the most risk-taking consumer. For prior risk beliefs
smaller (larger) than p = 35%, predictions based on the naïve model are
distinctly more (less) control pessimistic than those based on the extended
model.
Figure 4: Landscape of predicted belief revisions
Notes: Points (cross marks) denote observations that do (not) comply with the consistency
definition. The blue and red fits are based on the naïve and the extended model (Table
2), respectively; the dotted fits represent hypothetical consumers who are most and least
precautious, respectively (see the main text for details).
16For the counterfactuals, we replaced the reported values of the variables MEALS, RAW
FISH, WASH HANDS, STORE FISH, and PREPARE FISH by their observed maximum and min-
imum values, respectively.
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Figure 4 suggests that precautionary e ort plays an important role in
understanding the updating of subjective risk beliefs. This conclusion is sup-
ported by the coe cient estimates of the naïve model (column 1 in Table
2). In particular, we find that subjects who take more (less) precaution than
the average consumer stated significantly lower (higher) posterior risk beliefs.
First di erences indicate that heterogeneity in each of the recorded precau-
tionary behaviors may account for di erences in posterior risk beliefs of 2.4 to
4.8 percent points.
Perceived vulnerability matters less than expected. The only significant
predictor is the SUBJECTIVE RISK of su ering a foodborne illness, which was
associated with a 2.2 percentage point larger posterior risk belief among sub-
jects who reported they bear a high risk. In agreement with the gender e ect
observed in many risk perception studies (Slovic 1999), MALE subjects had a 3.3
percentage point smaller posterior risk belief than female subjects. Posterior
risk beliefs were negatively associated with EDUCATION, decreasing by about
0.4 percent points per additional year of schooling. Notably, other indicators
related to risk literacy such as the NUMERACY test and the AGE of the subject
had no statistically significant association with the revision of risk beliefs.
Although the results of the naïve model are consistent with what one
would intuitively expect, the results of the extended model (column 2 in Ta-
ble 2) call for a more cautious interpretation. Indeed, once we account for
possible interaction e ects between prior risk beliefs and the characteristics
of the subject, the main e ects related to the precautionary behaviors are no
longer significant. Yet the first di erences related to precaution are of compa-
rable size to those of the naïve model, suggesting that precautionary behaviors
a ect the formation of the prior risk belief rather than the revision process.
We conclude that ignoring these interdependencies—as we do with the naïve
model—leads to overestimating the impact of precaution on the belief revision
process.
By controlling for potential confounding e ects, the extended model re-
veals an important main e ect that is masked in the naïve model. Subjects
increased their posterior risk belief by 2.9 percent points per weekly fish MEAL,
23
meaning that there is significant response to the quantitative part of the in-
formation provided. Even after controlling for the impact of education on the
formation of the prior risk belief, more-educated subjects state lower poste-
rior beliefs (0.6 percent points per year). As the interaction e ect between
the PRIOR and the years of EDUCATION is statistically not di erent from zero
(not reported in Table 2), the latter finding might be interpreted as imply-
ing that more-educated subjects put more weight on the information if their
prior risk belief were higher than the statistical risk. Again, we do not observe
that indicators of numerical skills other than education are associated with
the updating of risk beliefs.
In both specifications the modeled precision in belief updating decreases
with AGE and is higher among MALE subjects. Precision also increases with the
years of attained EDUCATION and is significantly higher for subjects who passed
the NUMERACY test, indicating that young, more-educated males responded far
more homogeneously to the information provided than older, less-educated
females.
5.3 Unobserved Heterogeneity in Belief Updating
So far we have implicitly assumed that heterogeneity in belief updating can
be captured by observable characteristics of the subjects. Indeed, the analysis
above identified a number of predictors that explain the updating of risk beliefs.
There is, however, good reason to believe that unobserved characteristics also
a ect the revision process (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). The intuition is that
response to information varies from one group of subjects to another, but the
corresponding group memberships are unobserved.
Table 3 presents our preferred beta regression mixture model, which pre-
sumes there exist four latent classes of belief updaters.17 The belief updating
17We explored various beta regression mixtures with up to six latent classes.Four classes
yielded the best results in terms of common information criteria (AIC, BIC, ICL-BIC)
throughout the analysis. The appendix provides a summary of these goodness-of-fit mea-
sures and reports specification and robustness tests. While the membership composition
varies somewhat across the di erent model specifications, the thrust of the results remains
unchanged.
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function µk reflects that MEAL is the only predictor related to precautionary
e ort that seems to have direct impact on the belief revision process (see the
extended model in Table 2). The membership function fik includes gender,
age, educational attainment, and numeracy as concomitant variables.18 As
the identification of the latent classes is co-determined by these indicators, the
model includes a unique precision term „k for each latent class k.
The mixture model clusters the observed relationship between prior and
posterior beliefs into four latent classes. This classification is based on the
highest class membership probability at convergence, i.e. subject i belongs to
latent class k i  · (ú)ik = max ·
(ú)
iu ’u. Each of the classes represents a distinct
pattern of belief revision. Figure 5 shows the class-specific updating functions
and the corresponding class membership probabilities at convergence (whereby
brighter colors indicate a higher probability of belonging to class k).
The purple dots represent 176 subjects who ignored the information pro-
vided and refused to substantially revise their risk beliefs. We hence refer to
this class as information refuseniks. The blue dots represent the class of belief
adopters, comprising 276 subjects whose revised risk beliefs are close to the sta-
tistical risk s. The green dots represent the class of Bayesian learners, which
includes 420 subjects who combined their prior risk belief and the information
provided in a manner consistent with the Bayesian learning hypothesis to form
a new posterior risk belief. Lastly, the red dots represent 131 subjects whose
updating behavior largely overlaps with the belief revisions of subjects whom
we classified as inconsistent updaters according to the consistency definition.19
The results displayed Figure 5 warrant some remarks. First, the classifi-
cation obtained from the mixture model is far from crisp; i.e., for most subjects
the maximum probability of membership in any class is much less than one.
We find that · (ú)ik Ø 12 holds for 80% of the observations, · (ú)ik Ø 23 holds for 45%
of the observations, and · (ú)ik Ø 910 holds for 14% of the observations. Such a
18We keep predictors of the updating function and the membership function deliberately
separated as otherwise the identifying assumption of local independence might be violated
(McLachlan and Peel 2000).
19There is a 84% overlap of the classifications obtained by mixture modeling and based
on the consistency definition.
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noisy classification is not unusual in empirical applications of mixture models
and reflects the inverse relationship between the number of latent classes and
the discriminatory power of the mixture model.
Figure 5: Latent patterns of belief updating
Notes: Colors reflect class memberships; brighter colors indicate higher class membership
probability at convergence; lines represent class-specific beta regression fits.
Second, we find that the precision in updating among inconsistent up-
daters is up to six times smaller than among members of the other classes.
This highlights the element of randomness in the belief revision of inconsis-
tent updaters. Bayesian learners and belief adopters have almost the same
estimated precision, suggesting that there is no sharp boundary between the
two updating strategies. In contrast, information refuseniks have a very high
precision estimate. The posterior beliefs of this class are close to their prior
27
beliefs, whether low or high.
Third, the updating functions of the four classes are distinctly di erent.
Inconsistent updaters who eat fish more (less) often than the average consumer
in the sample reduce (increase) their posterior risk belief in response to the
information. This highlights the similarity between the class of inconsistent
updaters as classified by the mixture model and violators of the consistency
definition. Members of other latent classes increase (reduce) their posterior
risk beliefs if their fish consumption is higher (lower) than average, with infor-
mation refuseniks giving least weight and belief adopters giving most weight
to their consumption.
Fourth, estimates of the class membership function indicate that numer-
acy, age, and educational attainment influence the likelihood of belonging to
a specific class k. In particular, the probability to be classified as inconsistent
updater increases with AGE, is higher among subjects who failed the NUMERACY
test and had attained less EDUCATION. Apart from their age, the class of infor-
mation refuseniks is not much di erent from the class of inconsistent updaters,
suggesting that the refusal to update might be a strategy of coping with in-
formation one cannot process.
5.4 Inconsistent Belief Updating
Concomitant-variable latent class models are a powerful method for classify-
ing observations based on both unobservable and observable characteristics
(Dayton and Macready 1988). One drawback, however, is that we estimate
the impact of the concomitant variables on the membership function of each
of the K≠1 classes (using class c as the baseline). We obtain a valid between-
class comparison, but as soon as there are more than two classes it is di cult
to compare the e ect of the concomitant variables on one particular group of
interest to the common e ect on all other classes.
Let us put the interpretation issue into the context of our analysis. If we
seek to better understand inconsistent updating, it seems natural to compare
inconsistent updaters to consistent updaters rather than to di erent types of
28
consistent updaters. Moreover, such a comparison allows us to explore similar-
ities and di erences between the parametric classification based on the mixture
modeling and the non-parametric classification of the consistency definition.
Table 4 reports the estimates of two heteroskedastic probit models that link
inconsistent updating as established by the parametric classification (PC) of
the beta regression mixture model and by the non-parametric classification
(NPC) of the consistent belief updating definition to indicators of consump-
tion, precautionary e ort, and socio-economic factors. In both specifications,
we test for heteroskedasticity across subjects with di erent attitudes toward
the baseline risk and risk controllability.
We discuss significant predictors of inconsistent updating in terms of
their estimated marginal e ects at sample means.20 These can be readily in-
terpreted as the expected change in the probability of being an inconsistent
updater conditional on a change in the value of the particular predictor. Under
both classifications, the probability of being classified as inconsistent updater
increases by 6.3 to 8.9 percentage points if the subject lives with young KIDS
and it decreases by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points for each year of AGE. Although
only significant in the NPC model, we find indication of a gender e ect with
MALE subjects being 2.7 to 5 percentage points less likely to inconsistently
revise their risk beliefs. In both specifications eating fish more often than
the average consumer increases the likelihood of being classified as inconsis-
tent. However, the consumption e ect is much stronger in the NPC model (9.4
percentage points for each additional MEAL) than in the PC model (1.7 percent-
age points for each additional MEAL), where in addition RAWFISH consumption
raises the likelihood of being classified as inconsistent (by 1.1 percentage point
per additional RAWFISH meal).
Attitudes toward baseline risk and controllability have a large and sig-
nificant e ect on the likelihood to inconsistently revising risk beliefs. Among
subjects exhibiting BASELINE PESSIMISM the likelihood of inconsistent up-
20For the heteroskedastic probit model, the marginal e ect of a change in variable w
is ˆ Pr(I=1|X,V)ˆw = „
Ë
—ÕX
exp(ÏÕV)
È
—w≠(—ÕX)Ïw
exp(ÏÕV) , with only the first (second) term on the RHS
applying if w appears only in X (V).
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dating was 5.9 to 8.2 percentage points lower than among baseline-optimistic
subjects, while CONTROL PESSIMISM increased the likelihood by 10.6 percent-
age points (PC model) and 28.2 percentage points (NC model), respectively.
Coherent with the results of the beta regression mixture model, we find that in
the PC model EDUCATION and NUMERACY have a large e ect on the consistency
of belief revisions. Indeed, the likelihood of being classified as inconsistent falls
by 1.4 percentage points with each additional year of schooling and it is 30.2
percentage points lower among subjects who passed the NUMERACY test. The
NC model does not reflect such strong cognitive e ects, hinting at the fact that
di erences in the frequency of fish consumption alone might be insu cient to
classify the updating behavior.21
6 Discussion
Providing relevant and accurate information to the public is a central aspect
of information-based health policies, but it does not su ce for the welfare
assessment of such policies. Policy makers also need to know how (if at all)
people respond to the provided information. Below, we discuss the key findings
of our study both on the individual and the aggregate level of belief revisions.
6.1 Individual Response to Information
The key question related to the e cacy of information-based health policies
is who is going to respond by how much to the information provided (Magat
and Viscusi 1992). We have examined patterns of belief revision including,
in particular, apparent heterogeneity. Surprisingly little of this heterogene-
ity is explained by the precautionary e ort subjects made to reduce the risk
of contracting a foodborne illness. Rather, we find that risk perceptions in-
creased with higher consumption of fish and concerns about seafood safety.
This finding is consistent with the risk-as-feeling hypothesis (Loewenstein et
21This is not a shortcoming of the consistent updating definition per se, but relates to our
limited knowledge of  Di.
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al. 2001), which postulates that responses to risk information result in part
from feelings such as worry, fear, dread, or anxiety that arise at the time of be-
lief updating. These feelings may exert a reciprocal influence on the cognitive
evaluation of risk-related information, suppressing consideration of objectively
risk-increasing or risk-reducing factors.
Recent research by Peters et al. (2006) finds that people di er in the
degree to which they process risks cognitively versus a ectively. In particu-
lar, their research indicates that highly numerate people draw more meaning
from probabilities, frequencies, and other numerical comparisons than the less
numerate do. In consequence, numerical risk information provides less mean-
ing to individuals with lower numerical skills and is therefore less helpful in
updating risk beliefs. Moreover, Peters and colleagues found that less numer-
ate individuals are more prone to respond to irrelevant information suggesting
that numerical information may even distort belief revisions. These findings
on the ability to process numerical information support the results reported in
Tables 3 and 4. Less educated, less numerate, and older subjects were much
more likely to inconsistently update their risk beliefs.
6.2 Aggregate Response to Information
Even at the aggregate level, some noteworthy observations can be made on
the response to the risk information. Unlike a vast number of psychological
studies (Harris and Hahn 2011) we do not find unrealistic optimism about
future life events. On average, our subjects were pessimistic when they formed
their prior risk beliefs (E(p) = 32%) and remained slightly pessimistic (E [q] =
23%) upon receiving information about the statistical risk of contracting a
fishborne illness and the possible means to control this risk. As the sample
was constructed to be representative of French fish consumers, we would expect
E [q] t s if subjects were Bayesians. A Mann-Whitney test clearly rejects the
hypothesized equality.
As the belief revision protocol was embedded in a larger survey on fish
consumption, there might have been a salience e ect at play. Recent and un-
32
usual events are more memorable and people therefore tend to draw on them
when reasoning about experiencing similar events in the future (Gilbert and
Wilson 2007). Yet the relative nature of the belief revision task emphasized
both the risk of contracting a foodborne illness from fish as well as from other
foods, making the salience hypothesis less plausible. Another possible expla-
nation for control pessimism at the aggregate level is alarmist reactions to risk
information (Viscusi 1997): people focus on worst-case scenarios when they
update risk beliefs. For instance, some subjects might have believed that the
eating of raw fish would drastically increase their risk compared to the average
consumer. While this would justify higher prior risk beliefs, it is hard to rec-
oncile with higher posterior risk once we control for precautionary behavior.
Lastly, we note that the sample median posterior risk belief was equal to the
statistical risk (M [q] = 16%) suggesting that mean control pessimism could
be driven by outliers.22
To explore the last explanation in more detail we compared consistent
to inconsistent updaters, using both the parametric and non-parametric clas-
sification of inconsistent updating. We find a stark information e ect among
consistent updaters, but no e ect at all among the inconsistent updaters.23
This suggests that, as a group, inconsistent updaters could not infer much
from the risk-related information. Yet since inconsistent subjects were about
twice as often control-pessimistic as they were control-optimistic, we can also
reject that they just made random belief updates. But what is it that drives
inconsistent belief revisions? The results obtained from both the mixture
modeling and the heterogeneous probit analyses confirm the individual-level
finding that inconsistent updaters tend to be older, less educated, and less
likely to have passed the simple numeracy test than members of the other la-
22The sample mean is more a ected by high posterior risk beliefs than it is a ected by low
ones simply because the statistical risk, that is the population mean (which should equal
the sample mean for a representative sample), is smaller than 50%.
23This observation holds under both the non-parametric classification based on the con-
sistency definition: (E [p|INPC = 0] = 28.8%,E [q|INPC = 0] = 21.4%) vs (E [p|INPC = 1] =
32.1%,E [q|INPC = 1] = 32.3%) as well as the parametric classification based on the
mixture modeling: (E [p|IPC = 0] = 31.1%,E [q|IPC = 0] = 21.6%) vs (E [p|IPC = 1] =
34.6%,E [q|IPC = 1] = 34.4%).
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tent classes (albeit we do not find statistically significant di erences between
inconsistent updaters and information refuseniks). This highlights that spe-
cific groups within society are particularly prone to misunderstand health risk
communications and that addressing these groups is indeed a challenge.
Heterogeneity in belief revision suggests that risk communication meth-
ods should be tailored to specific groups of recipients to obtain the optimal
e ects. Individuals who can process numerical risk information and update
their prior beliefs in a consistent fashion may be well-served by providing such
statistical information; in contrast, individuals who cannot consistently pro-
cess such information may be better served by alternative risk-communication
messages, including perhaps messages that direct them to take specific actions
(e.g., avoid raw fish, keep fish refrigerated until preparation, etc.). Individuals
who fail to update their prior beliefs (information refuseniks) may already be
well-informed about risks of consuming fish and other foods so that the in-
formation provided in the survey has negligible value; alternatively, they may
distrust the source of the information and so alternative sources may be more
influential.
Although we have identified substantial heterogeneity in patterns of risk
belief updating, we have only limited ability to predict how any individual will
update. On average, individuals who are more numerate, highly-educated,
and younger are better able to process numerical risk information and to up-
date their prior beliefs in a consistent way, but these are weak predictors and
conceal much variation. It may be useful in future work to identify more ac-
curate methods for predicting how di erent individuals will respond to risk
information, and what forms of communication are most e ective for di erent
individuals.
7 Conclusion
Economists typically employ the Bayesian learning model to predict the suc-
cess of information-based policies. More often than not, it is presumed that
people perfectly update their beliefs. Yet outcomes of information campaigns
34
depend crucially on people’s actual behavior, which in turn is contingent upon
whether the disseminated information is taken up and processed in the ex-
pected way. In this paper we have explored the revision of risk beliefs in
the realm of food safety. We find evidence for four patterns or strategies of
updating subjective beliefs about the risk of contracting a foodborne illness.
Our analysis suggests that the di erences between these strategies are not
explained by individual precautionary behavior, but are mainly related to in-
dicators of numeracy. Because information campaigns are often targeted at
demographic groups with limited numerical skills, policy makers should seek
to communicate statistical information in the most accessible way possible—
perhaps even at the cost of simplifying—and consider to tailor information
to account for the fact that individuals may di er in the type of assistance
they need in making health-related choices. Even if policy makers do so, we
cannot anticipate everybody to correctly understand and follow public health
advisories. Hence, deficiency in risk numeracy has to be taken into account
when predicting the outcome of health information policies.
35
Appendix
Figure 6: Histogram of class membership probabilities at convergence
Notes: The histograms correspond to the classes identified by the main beta regression
mixture model reported on in Table 3.
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